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We examine the strong pairwise stability concept in network formation theory under
collective network beneﬁts. Strong pairwise stability considers a pair of players to
add a link through mutual consent while permitting them to unilaterally delete any
subset of links under their control. We examine the properties of strongly pairwise
stable networks and ﬁnd that players in middleman positions, who have the power to
break up the network into multiple components, play a critical role in such networks.
We show that for the component-wise egalitarian rule there is no conﬂict between the
eﬃcient and stable networks when these middlemen have no incentive to break up the
network. Finally, we examine eﬃciency and stability in middleman-free networks.
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Networks play a signiﬁcant role in the economic life of individuals. Their functions include
such wide ranging tasks as the dissemination of information, the creation of synergies,
facilitating aﬀordable forms of economic exchange, and the enforcement of norms.
The literature on networks in economics has witnessed an upsurge both in terms of in-
terest and clarity of the issues related to the fundamental principles of network formation
with the publication of the seminal contribution of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) on link-
based stability concepts in a game theoretic approach to network formation. The literature
currently covers theories of the formation of diverse network structures such as networks
between acquaintances (Brueckner 2003, Gilles and Sarangi 2004), trade networks (Goyal
and Joshi 1999, Kranton and Minehart 2001, Furusawa and Konishi 2002), labor markets
as contact networks (Montgomery 1991, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004), informa-
tion exchange networks (Bala and Goyal 2000, Haller and Sarangi 2003), and the Internet
(Badasyan and Chakrabarti 2004).1
The most fundamental insight put forward by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is that
there is a profound tension between eﬃciency and stability in game theoretic models of
network formation. Indeed, networks that generate maximal collective values — indicated
as eﬃcient networks — are usually not stable in the sense that players have incentives to
delete existing links or create new links. Since their inﬂuential paper many authors have
discussed this fundamental tension between eﬃciency and stability of social networks.2
In this paper we examine the role of middlemen in attaining eﬃciency in stable net-
works. Our paper examines the conﬂict between eﬃciency and stability in networks with
middlemen and identiﬁes circumstances under which this tension is resolved. As a corol-
lary we also examine the implications for networks that do not have middlemen.
Middlemen are individuals with positional power who can disrupt a network by dis-
connecting it. They can play a variety of roles in networks from acting as matchmak-
ers who reduce costs of waiting by bringing together buyers and sellers (Rubinstein and
Wolinsky 1987), to experts who who can resolve information asymmetries (Klein and
Leﬄer 1981, Biglaiser 1993) or just disseminate information about quality (Biglaiser and
Friedman 1994).
To understand the role of middlemen in networks we use a link-based stability concept
1There is also a relatively large literature on networks in other disciplines like sociology, operations
research, and physics. Here we refer to, for example, Barabasi (2002) and Watts (2003). The diﬀerence of
the treatment in economics is that nodes are agents capable of volition, and hence capable of forming and
deleting links.
2For a discussion of this strand of the literature we refer to the excellent review by Jackson (2003).
1called strong pairwise stability formalized by Gilles and Sarangi (2004).3 Unlike pairwise
stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) where a pair of players can either add or sever a
single link at a time, strong pairwise stability takes gives players the ability to delete one or
more of the links in which they participate. The creation of a link requires mutual consent
and hence as in pairwise stability players considering forming only one link at a time. On
the other hand, breaking a relationship in the network is an unilateral act and, consequently,
under strong pairwise stability a player can delete any subset of her links.
The ability to delete multiple links is a realistic modiﬁcation of pairwise stability that
provides us with a more natural stability concept. This stability concept is also a hybrid
between pairwise stability and the notion of so-called Nash networks since like pairwise
stability it considers the addition of a single link at a time while permitting the deletion of
multiple links by a player at the same time as in Nash equilibrium. It can be shown that
for certain normal form game-theoretic models of network formation, Nash equilibria are
characterized by stability against the removal of sets of links by individual players. (Gilles
and Sarangi 2004, Propositions 3.1 and 3.10) This is also recognized by Goyal and Joshi
(2003) and Bloch and Jackson (2004) who discuss pairwise stable equilibria. This concept
combines the Nash equilibrium property with stability against pairs of players forming
additional links. This notion is therefore closely related to strong pairwise stability. It
should also be clear that pairwise stable equilibrium networks can only be investigated in
the context of (non-cooperative) network formation games.
Further, it has been argued that pairwise stability is a relatively weak concept since
it admits a relatively large number of networks. On the other hand the notion of strong
stability (Jackson and van den Nouweland 2004) or strong group stability (Konishi and
Utku ¨ Unver 2003) of networks are in many ways too strong; admitting too few networks.
Thus there is a need for intermediate notions of stability.4 We argue that strong pairwise
stability is one such concept.
Given that strong pairwise stability allows an agent to delete multiple links and even
disconnect the network, it shifts the focus from individual links (as in pairwise stability)
to the player herself. Thus, it provides a natural modelling tool for studying the role of
middlemeninnetworks. Itallowsustofocusontheirpositionalpowerinthenetwork. With
the exception of Kalai, Postlewaite, and Roberts (1978) the issue of middlemen in networks
3We remark that Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) already indicated without formalizing, several generaliza-
tions of their pairwise stability concept, including what we call strong pairwise stability in this paper. Bloch
and Jackson (2004) also use the notion of strong pairwise stability, but label it as pairwise stability*. Closely
related to this is also the notion of pairwise stable equilibrium studied by Goyal and Joshi (2003). For a
discussion of these two concepts we refer mainly to Bloch and Jackson (2004).
4For a survey of the recent theoretical developments in the networks literature we refer the reader to
Jackson (2003), Goyal (2004) and Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001).
2remains largely unexplored. They measure the power of middlemen in core allocations of
a 3-person exchange economy. Interestingly they ﬁnd that players occupying a middleman
position need not always be better oﬀ. One of their main ﬁndings is that, if preferences
are strictly monotonic and trade through the middleman is beneﬁcial to the grand coalition,
then there do exist points in the core where the middleman is better oﬀ.
Here, insteadofinvestigatingwhenmiddlemenarebetteroﬀ, welookattherelationship
between stability and eﬃciency and ﬁnd some similarities with the results of Kalai, Postle-
waite, and Roberts (1978). We show that for strong pairwise stability the coincidence of
eﬃciency and stability occurs for component-wise egalitarian payoﬀs. Jackson and Wolin-
sky (1996) showed that so-called critical links have to be neutralized in order to establish
pairwise stable and eﬃcient networks. Here we establish that middlemen in the network
have to be secured in the sense that they have no incentives to break communication in the
network.
A middleman occupies a critical position in the network in that she can disconnect
communication lines by removing certain links under her control. A secure middleman
will not disrupt the functioning of the social network because they tend to lose more. In
a related study, anthropologist Jean Ensminger has argued that those who occupy central
positions in the social network of the Orma tribe in Kenya behave more fairly in dictator
and trust games since they have more to lose. Ensminger further argues that persons oc-
cupying the middlemen positions in the Orma social network can act as agents of change
for social norms. Consequently, since fairness and reputation matter more in market-based
economies, the middlemen try to instill these values since they beneﬁt the most from mar-
kets (Ensminger and Knight 1997, Knight and Ensminger 1998). Thus when the incentives
of the middlemen are aligned with those of the others players it is possible to generate
maximal collective values in the network.
We ﬁnd that for middleman-free networks, the component-wise egalitarian rule ensures
that eﬃcient networks are also strongly pairwise stable. The intuition for this is quite
simple. Since no one has any positional advantage, the (component) egalitarian rule is
adequate to resolve the tension between stability and eﬃciency. In a sense if any player
attempts to exploit the network, given that all players occupy the same position in the
network, the others can easily disconnect a player that tries to expropriate more than his
fair share.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 introduce network mod-
elling principles and the diﬀerent stability concepts mentioned above. Section 4 is devoted
to strongly pairwise stable networks and its relation to earlier work in the literature. Sec-
tion 5 is about networks with middlemen and in Section 6 we present networks without
3middlemen. Section 7 concludes.
2 Modelling principles
In this section we deﬁne the formal elements used in describing network formation, in-
cluding some concepts borrowed from graph theory. This is followed by the description of
generation of (collective) value and its allocation in a network.
2.1 Networks and network components
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of players. Two distinct players i, j ∈ N are linked
if i and j are mutual partners in some social or economic activity. This could range from
an exchange network to a group involved in an economically productive relationship to an
ethnic social network that provides information about new job openings. The two players
forming a link are assumed to be “equals” within the relationship, as no player has the
power to coerce the other into forming or staying in the relationship. Thus we restrict our
attention only to undirected networks or graphs. We allow for the possibility that these
relationships have spillover eﬀects on the network relations between other players. This is
captured by the formal description of such network beneﬁts.
Formally, an (undirected) link between i and j is deﬁned as the set {i, j} and we use the
shorthand notation ij to denote this link. Clearly ij is equivalent to ji.
The player set N permits a total of 1
2n(n − 1) potential links. The collection of these
potential links on N is denoted by
gN = {ij | i, j ∈ N and i , j} (1)
A network g is now deﬁned as any collection of links g ⊂ gN. The collection of all networks
on N is denoted by GN = {g | g ⊂ gN} and consists of 2
1
2n(n−1) networks. The network gN
composed of all possible links is called the complete network on N and the network g0 = ∅
consisting of no links is the empty network on N.
Let π: N → N be a permutation on N. For every network g ∈ GN the corresponding
permutation is denoted by gπ = {π(i)π(j) | ij ∈ g} ∈ GN. Two networks g,h ∈ GN
have the same topology if there exists a permutation π: N → N such that h = gπ. This
is denoted as g ∼ h. For g ∈ GN the corresponding network topology is denoted by
g = {h ∈ GN | h ∼ g}. Clearly a network topology is a mathematical equivalence class with
regard to the binary relationship ∼. It is obvious that the collection of all networks GN is
partitioned into network topologies.
4For every network g ∈ GN, and every player i ∈ N, we denote i’s neighborhood in g
by Ni(g) = {j ∈ N | j , i and ij ∈ g}. Player i therefore (directly) interacts with those
in her link set Li(g) = {ij ∈ g | j ∈ Ni(g)} ⊂ g. We also deﬁne N(g) = ∪i∈NNi(g) and let
n(g) = #N(g) with the convention that if N(g) = ∅, we let n(g) = 1.5
A path in g connecting players i and j is a set of distinct players {i1,i2,...,ip} ⊂ N(g)
with p > 2 such that i1 = i, ip = j, and {i1i2,i2i3,...,ip−1ip} ⊂ g. A path between two
distinct players i, j ∈ N (assuming that a path exists between i and j) is shortest if it consists
of a minimal number of players. Note that a shortest path between i and j contains one and
only one member of the neighborhood set Ni(g), as well as one and only one member of
the neighborhood set Nj(g). The set of all shortest paths is denoted by Pij(g). If there is no
path between i and j, then Pij(g) = ∅.
Let tij(g) denote the geodesic distance between i and j, which is deﬁned as follows: If
Pij(g) = ∅, then tij(g) = ∞. Otherwise, tij(g) =
¯ ¯ ¯N(pij(g))
¯ ¯ ¯ − 1.
The network g′ ⊂ g is a component of g if for all i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g′), i , j, there
exists a path in g′ connecting i and j and for any i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g), ij ∈ g implies
ij ∈ g′. In other words, a component is simply a maximally connected subnetwork of g.
We denote the class of network components of the network g by C(g). The set of players
that are not connected in the network g are collected in the set of (fully) disconnected or
isolated players in g denoted by
N0(g) = N \ N(g) = {i ∈ N | Ni(g) = ∅}.
Furthermore, we deﬁne
Γ(g) = {N(h) | h ∈ C(g)} ∪ {{i} | i ∈ N0(g)} (2)
as the partitioning of the player set N based on the component structure of the network g.6
2.2 Collective network beneﬁts and eﬃciency
We describe the beneﬁts or “utilities” generated by participation in a network through a
collective network beneﬁt functions given by v: GN → R such that v(∅) = 0. Following
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we refer to such functions as “network value” functions. A
network value function v assigns a total beneﬁt v(g) ∈ R to the network g ∈ GN. The space
5We emphasize here that if N(g) , ∅, we have that n(g) > 2. Namely, in those cases the network has to
consist of at least one link.
6We therefore distinguish alink-based partitioning ofa network g into components, denoted byC(g), from
a node-based partitioning denoted by Γ(g). Both conventions are necessary to analyze the role middlemen
who represent a special type of node with multiple links to others that could potentially lead to diﬀerent
components.







-dimensional Euclidean vector space.
Let v ∈ VN be some network value function. We now deﬁne two useful properties of




nent additivity requires that the total value generated in a network is the sum of the
values generated in each component. An immediate consequence of component
additivity is the fact that isolated players i ∈ N0(g) generate no value.
(ii) The network value function v is anonymous if v(gπ) = v(g) for all permutations
π and networks g. Anonymity implies that the beneﬁts v(g), depend only on the
topology of the network g.
Finally, we deﬁne the notion of network eﬃciency using the collective beneﬁts generated
bythenetwork. Anetworkg ∈ GN iseﬃcient withrespecttovaluefunction vifv(g) > v(g′)
for all g′ ⊂ gN.7
2.3 Allocation rules
Next, we discuss the problem of allocating these collective network beneﬁts or “values”
amongst the members of a network. The payoﬀ to an individual player is given by an
allocation rule Y: GN ×VN → RN which determines how the collective value is distributed
over the individual players. Thus Yi(g,v) is the payoﬀ to player i from the network g under
the value function v. We now deﬁne some appealing properties for an allocation rule.
Recall that π: N → N is a permutation. Let vπ be deﬁned by vπ(gπ) = v(g).
(i) An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any permutation π, Yπ(i)(gπ,vπ) = Yi(g,v).
Anonymity of the allocation rule simply means that the payoﬀ of a player depends
solely on their position in the network rather than the label of the players.
(ii) An allocation rule Y is balanced if
P
i∈N Yi(g,v) = v(g) for all v and g. 8
(iii) An allocation rule Y is component balanced if
P
i∈N(h)Yi(g,v) = v(h) for every g
and h ∈ C(g) and every component additive v.
Remark 2.1 We note that component balance implies balance for every component ad-
ditive network value function. Also, component balance along with component additivity
implies that fully disconnected players in N0(g) always have an allocated payoﬀ of zero.
7In the literature these are also referred to as strongly eﬃcient networks. See for instance Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996).
8Balance is also known as “eﬃciency” in the literature.







where hi ∈ C(g) such that i ∈ N(hi) and hi = ∅ if there is no h ∈ C(g) such that i ∈ N(h).
Under this allocation rule, the value generated by a component is split equally among the
members of that component.
Remark 2.2 The component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Yce is the unique allocation
rule Y that is component balanced and assigns an equal payoﬀ to all players in the same
component of a network, i.e., for all (g,v) ∈ GN × VN it holds that
Yi(g,v) = Yj(h,v) (4)
for every h ∈ C(g) and all i, j ∈ N(h).
Finally we mention that Yce( ,v) is balanced for every component additive v ∈ VN. The
component-wise egalitarian payoﬀ rule is not balanced for arbitrary network value func-
tions. Equation (4) implies also that the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule is
anonymous.
3 Stability properties
A network is a collection of links. It is the culmination of a process in which players
establish links or sever existing links. In this section we discuss the principles underlying
network formation and their stability from a link-based perspective. The central tenet of
our approach is that in principle, the formation of each link must be considered separately.
Each link in the network involves a pair of players and its formation requires the mutual
consent of those two players. Thus the creation of a link has to be considered one at a time.
However, each player can delete a link unilaterally. Therefore we consider stability with
respect to the deletion of links and the addition of links separately.
We ﬁrst introduce some auxiliary notation. Denote by g + ij the network obtained by
adding link ij to the existing network g, i.e., g + ij = g ∪ {ij}. Similarly, g − ij denotes the
network that results from deleting link ij from the existing network g, i.e., g − ij = g \ {ij}.
Let Y be some allocation rule. We discuss three fundamental network stability proper-
ties that encapsulate the network formation principles described above.
(i) A network g ∈ GN is link deletion proof (LDP) if for every player i ∈ N and every
neighbor j ∈ Ni(g), it holds that Yi(g − ij,v) 6 Yi(g,v). Link deletion proofness
requires that each individual player has no incentive to sever an existing link with
one of her neighbors.
7(ii) A network g ∈ GN is strong link deletion proof (SLDP) if for every player i ∈ N
and every set of neighbors M ⊂ Ni(g), it holds that Yi(g \ hM,v) 6 Yi(g,v) where
hM = {ij ∈ g | j ∈ M} ⊂ Li(g). Strong link deletion proofness requires that
each player has no incentive to sever links with one or more of his neighbors.
Obviously, SLDP implies LDP.
(iii) A network g ∈ GN is link addition proof if for all players i, j ∈ N, it holds that
Yi(g+ij,v) > Yi(g,v) implies Yj(g+ij,v) < Yj(g,v). Link addition proofness states
that there are no incentives to form additional links. This is founded on a process
of mutual consent in link formation. Indeed, when one player would like to add a
link, the other player could have strong objections.9
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced link deletion proofness and link addition proof-
ness, although they did not explicitly deﬁne these concepts as such. Strong link deletion
proofness was introduced recently by Gilles and Sarangi (2004).
These three fundamental stability concepts can be used to deﬁne additional stability
concepts. A network g ∈ GN is pairwise stable if it is link deletion proof and link addition
proof. Furthermore, a network g ∈ GN is strongly pairwise stable if it is strong link deletion
proof and link addition proof.
The main diﬀerence between the regular pairwise stability and strong pairwise stability
is that individual players are allowed to remove multiple links rather than a single link
under their control. This is the same as the diﬀerence between LDP and SLDP.
We ﬁrst remark that strong pairwise stability is a natural link-based stability concept.
Since links require mutual consent, it considers the addition of one link at a time. However,
link deletion is unilateral and, hence, it allows a single player to delete multiple links at the
same time. Thus, while pairwise stability can only focus on links, by permitting deletion of
multiplelinksstrongpairwisestabilityallowsustofocusonlinksaswellastheplayerswho
form these links. Second, Goyal and Joshi (2003) discuss positive and negative spillovers
in networks in relation to strong pairwise stability and show that a large class of network
topologies satisfy this property. They show that in games with positive spillovers where
the players are playing against the ﬁeld, a strongly pairwise stable network is either empty,
or complete, or has a dominant group topology. With negative spillovers it is possible
to obtain the empty networks and stars as strongly pairwise stable networks. Moreover,
regular (or symmetric) and irregular networks with unequal connections are possible with
negative spillovers in the playing ﬁeld games.
9Considering one link at a time with regard to link formation in this fashion seems natural. A general-
ization to the simultaneous formation of multiple links wold not yield much unless it is incorporated within
a coalitional framework. Such coalitional considerations are the foundation of the notion of strong stability
introduced and analyzed by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2004).
8We now provide a simple three player network formation game that demonstrates the
natural advantages of strong pairwise stability over (regular) pairwise stability. It illustrates
that pairwise stability has some serious limitations in the sense that individual players do
not have the ability to delete multiple links even in situations where this is extremely desir-
able.
Example 3.1 Being stuck in bad company
Consider a three player situation with N = {1,2,3}. For simpliﬁcation of notation we
denote the potential links in this situation as follows: a = 12, b = 13, and c = 23. Hence,
GN = {∅,a,b,c,ab,ac,bc,abc}.









































2(1 + α)v(abc), 1
2(1 + α)v(abc)
´
Note that Y is component balanced. Our main claim is that in general, under the allocation
rule Y, the complete network abc is LDP, but not SLDP:
Claim: If v ∈ VN such that v(g) > 0 for every g , ∅, then the network g⋆ = abc is link
deletion proof, but not strong link deletion proof, with respect to the allocation rule Y.
The claim states that if a player does not have the possibility of removing multiple links
simultaneously, he might get stuck with “bad company”. Indeed, here player 1 would like
to remove his links with player 2 as well as player 3, but using LDP he can only remove
at most one of these two links. Under SLDP player 1 is able to remove both links and
improve his situation.
Proof of the claim: Let v ∈ VN be such that v(g) > 0 for every g , ∅. That g⋆ = abc is not
SLDP is clear since player 1 would like to remove both links a and b to arrive at network
c, which yields him Y1(c) = 0 > −αv(abc) = Y(abc).
We show that g⋆ = abc is LDP. Removing link a or link b would not yield a strict improve-
9mentforeitheroftheinvolvedplayers, sinceY1(abc) = Y1(bc) = Y1(ac), Y2(abc) = Y2(bc),
and Y3(abc) = Y3(ac). Finally, it is not proﬁtable to remove link c for players 2 and 3 since
Y2(ab) = 0 < 1
2(1 + α)v(abc) = Y2(abc) and
Y3(ab) = 0 < 1
2(1 + α)v(abc) = Y3(abc).
This implies that the complete network g⋆ = abc is LDP, as asserted. ¤
Example 3.1 clearly shows the limited applicability of regular link deletion proofness to
economic situations. Unless one considers a situation under strict control or supervision,
free individuals usually have the ability to sever unwanted connections and to escape situ-
ations as described in the example. From that perspective, strong pairwise stability is the
more applicable stability concept.
4 Properties of strongly pairwise stable networks
We have already seen that as a modeling principle strong pairwise stability has some of
advantages over pairwise stability. As a stability concept, it is still a modiﬁcation of the
more primitive notion of pairwise stability and therefore a comparison is appropriate. This
section provides a further examination of strong pairwise stability by illustrating a few
properties and applying it to some well known models in the literature. We also study the
relationship between eﬃciency, pairwise stability and strong pairwise stability.
4.1 Boundedness of payoﬀs in strongly pairwise stable networks
Using the insight from Example 3.1 we can draw a further conclusion – in general SLDP
networks only have bounded payoﬀs. This is the subject of the next proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Let v be a component additive network value function and Y be a compo-
nent balanced allocation rule. Then there exists some V > 0 such that 0 6 Yi(g,v) 6 V for
every strong link deletion proof network g ∈ GN and every player i ∈ N.
Proof. Let v be a component additive network value function and Y be a component bal-
anced allocation rule. These properties immediately imply that disconnected players are
always allocated zero. Hence, if for some player i we have that Yi(g) < 0 in some network
g ∈ GN, then
Yi (g \ Li(g)) = Yi(∅) = 0 > Yi(g) (5)
10In other words, by severing all links, player i can earn zero payoﬀs. Hence, if any player i




g∈GN v(g) > 0. (6)
Consider an arbitrary strongly pairwise stable network g ∈ GN. Given that Y is component
balanced, and therefore balanced,
P
i∈N Yi(g) = v(g) 6 V. From the above, Yi(g) > 0 for all
i ∈ N. Hence,
Yi(g) = v(g) −
X
j,i
Yj(g) 6 v(g) 6 V (7)
for all i ∈ N. ¤
Note that the result does not require anonymity of v or Y.
We emphasize that the boundedness of payoﬀs is a property of strongly pairwise stable
networks does not extend to regular pairwise stable networks. Example 3.1 shows that
individual players do not have the ability to guarantee themselves autarkic existence from
the other players in the network under regular pairwise stability. Hence, under pairwise
stability, the (individually) lower bound of the payoﬀ to any player is not zero, but rather
whatever this player is confronted with by his fellow players. This is not the case under
strong stability, where this lower bound is zero. This conﬁrms what Goyal and Joshi (2003)
ﬁnd in networks with negative spillovers — strongly pairwise stable networks are either
empty or stars.
4.2 The connections model
We discuss strong pairwise stability within the context of two popular and well-developed
explicit models of network value functions. First, we discuss the connections model and,
subsequently, we investigate strong pairwise stability in the context of unequal connec-
tions.10
In the connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) the links represent social
relationships like friendship between individuals. Since it is unrealistic to suppose that
payments could be exchanged for friendship we assume away the possibility of side pay-
ments. Consequently, Yi(g,v) = Y
γ
i (g) for all v ∈ VN. The payoﬀ that player i receives from












where δ ∈ (0,1) is the beneﬁts parameter, cij > 0 is the cost of establishing link ij for player
i and tij(g) is the number of links on the shortest path between i and j. If for the connections
model given in (8), it holds that all link formation costs are equal, i.e., cij = c > 0, then we
refer to this setup as the symmetric connections model.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) characterize the collection of pairwise stable networks
in the symmetric connections model. The next proposition shows that all pairwise stable
networks in the symmetric connections model are also strong pairwise stable. This is a
consequence of the additive nature of the (connections) allocation rule.
Proposition 4.2 Let n > 3. Every pairwise stable equilibrium in the symmetric connec-
tions model is strong pairwise stable.
For a proof of Proposition 4.2 we refer to the appendix of this paper.
An interesting extension of the symmetric connections model to a spatial setting has been
developed by Johnson and Gilles (2000). In their model, player i ∈ N, is located at xi and
the set X = {x1,..., xn} ⊂ [0,1] with x1 = 0 and xn = 1 represents the spatial distribution of
players. Without loss of generality assume that xi < xj if i < j. Thus, the distance between
the players i, j ∈ N is given by dij =
¯ ¯ ¯xi − xj
¯ ¯ ¯ 6 1. This allows for the link establishment
costs being determined by the spatial distance between players instead of having a ﬁxed
cost per link.
It is easy to verify that both Proposition 1 and 2 (which characterize the pairwise stable
networks) of Johnson and Gilles (2000) are satisﬁed by strong pairwise stability. The class
of acyclic pairwise stable (empty network and the chain) networks identiﬁed in their paper
are also strong pairwise stable. Arguments similar to the one given above can be used to
demonstrate this.
4.3 Unequal connections
Goyal and Joshi (2003) develop a framework to discuss unequal connections in which they
allow explicitly for the possibility of positive and negative spillovers arising due to links
between the players. They consider playing the ﬁeld games where spillovers depend on
the number of links all the other players have, and local spillovers where the externalities
depend on the number of links of a potential partner. Here we restrict attention to the local
12spillover games. The (gross) payoﬀs of player i satisfy local spillovers if for any network
g and any additional link ij it holds that
Yi(g + ij) − Yi(g) = Ψ(ηi(g),ηj(g)). (9)
where ηi(g) and ηj(g) denote the number of neighbors of player i and j respectively. Thus,
marginal returns depend on the number of links a player has, as well as the cardinality of
the neighborhood set of a potential partner. The identity of the potential partner is crucial
in local spillovers games since they may all have a diﬀerent number of links. Each link
has a cost c > 0 which must be subtracted to obtain the net beneﬁts of a link. We say that
marginal returns satisfy positive spillovers with respect to own links (PSOL) as well as
links of the potential partners (PSPL), if Ψ(ηi,ηj) is increasing in both ηi and ηj. We now
show that in this setting a pairwise stable network may not be strongly pairwise stable.
Example 4.3 Let c > 0 and let N = {1,2,3,4}. Consider the complete network gN on N,
where the marginal returns are given by Ψ(2,2) = 1.2c, Ψ(1,1) = c and Ψ(0,0) = 0.5c.
This network satisﬁes both PSOL and PSPL.
It is easy to check that no player wishes to break a single link and hence the network is
pairwise stable. But by deleting 3 links simultaneously, a player is better oﬀ since 3c −
2.7c > 0. Hence, gN is not strongly pairwise stable. ¤
Notethatitisalsopossibletoconstructothersuchexamplesaslongasthemarginalbeneﬁts
satisfy the PSOL property. This is because the marginal link may outweigh the links costs,
while the earlier links fail to do so. Hence, by deleting a subset of links a player might be
able to obtain a higher payoﬀ.
4.4 Component-wise egalitarian payoﬀs
A major focus of the networks literature has been on the conﬂict between stability and eﬃ-
ciency in social and economic networks. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) identify conditions
under which this conﬂict is resolved for the component-wise egalitarian rule. This is an
appealing allocation rule since it splits the value of a network equally among all members
of the component. In this section we revisit the earlier work on the tension between stabil-
ity and eﬃciency using strong pairwise stability. We begin by introducing the notion of a
critical link.
Deﬁnition 4.4 A link ij ∈ g ∈ GN is critical in the network g if #Γ(g) < #Γ(g − ij).
In other words, a link is critical if after its removal either the number of components of the
network increases, or the number of disconnected players increases. It means that there is
13no alternative path to replace such a critical link. A critical link is also known as a “bridge”
in the sociological literature on networks.
Let h ∈ C(g) denote a component that contains a critical link in the network g ∈ GN
and let h1 ⊂ h and h2 ⊂ h denote components obtained from h by severing that critical link.
(Note that it may be the case that h1 = ∅ or h2 = ∅.) We now deﬁne the notion of critical
link monotonicity introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in their discussion of the
properties of component egalitarian allocation rule Yce.
Deﬁnition 4.5 The pair (g,v) satisﬁes critical link monotonicity if for any critical link
ij ∈ h with h ∈ C(g) and the two associated components h1 and h2 of h − ij, we have that












This constitutes a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of eﬃcient networks
that are pairwise stable with regard to the component wise egalitarian allocation rule:
Claim 4.6 (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996, Claim, page 61)
If g is eﬃcient relative to a component additive v, then g is pairwise stable for Yce relative
to v if and only if (g,v) satisﬁes critical link monotonicity.
We next show that critical link monotonicity, however, is not adequate for strong pairwise
stability.




v(gN) = 2, and
v(g) = 0 for all other g ∈ G
N
Observe that v is component additive and anonymous.
Now consider the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Yce for this particular setup.
Clearly, every eﬃcient network is a star given by {ij,ik,il} for i = 1,2,3. However, a
star is not strongly pairwise stable because it is not SLDP. In fact, Yce
i ({ij,ik,il}) = 31
4,
Yce
i ({ij,ik}) = 12
3, and Yce
i ({ij}) = 5. Therefore, player i would sever two of his three links:
Yce
i ({ij,ik,il} \ {il,ik}) = Yce
i ({ij}) = 5 > 31
4 = Yce
i ({ij,ik,il}).
For the star h = {ij,ik,il} all three links are critical. Consider deletion of any link and let h1















This naturally leads to the question: What conditions are required to make eﬃcient net-
works strong pairwise stable under the component egalitarian allocation rule? Interest-
ingly, this leads us to a condition relating to the presence of middlemen in the network.
The analysis is presented below.
5 Networks with middlemen
A critical link refers to a single link between two players, whose removal results in a
disconnected network. On the other hand when a single player removes multiple links
leading to the disintegration of the network, we call such a player a middleman in the
network.12
Deﬁnition 5.1 A player i ∈ N has a middleman position in the network g ∈ GN if there
exists some set of links h∗ ⊂ Li(g) under the control of player i in g such that, there are at
least two distinct players j1, j2 ∈ N \{i} who are connected in g and who are not connected
in g\h∗. A player with a middleman position in a network g is denoted as a middleman in
g. The set of middlemen in the network g is denoted by M(g) ⊂ N.
It is clear from this deﬁnition that a middleman has a critical position in a network since she
can break up communication among other players in the network by deleting a well-chosen
subset of her own links. A subset h∗ ⊂ Li(g) of links that a middleman i ∈ M(g) can delete
to break up communication within a network g is called a critical link set for middleman i.
The following re-statement of the deﬁnition of a middleman is given without a proof.
It follows immediately from the deﬁnition of a middleman position in a network.
Remark 5.2 Let n > 3 and let g ∈ GN be some network with #Γ(g) = 1. Now, i ∈ M(g) if
and only if player i ∈ N controls a critical link set h∗ ⊂ Li(g) such that exactly one of the
following properties holds:
11In fact, in this example all of the 64 possible networks satisfy critical link monotonicity.
12In graph theory, the position of a middleman in the network is also referred to as a “cut node”.
15(i) #C(g \ h∗) > #C(g) = 1.
(ii) #C(g \ h∗) = 1 and there is some player j ∈ N \ N0(g) such that j ∈ N0(g \ h∗).
(iii) #C(g \ h∗) = 0 and N0(g \ h∗) = N.
Remark 5.2 states that a middleman in a network can either increase the number of non-
trivial components in the network by removing some critical links, or disconnect some
players from the network. In the latter case such disconnected players j ∈ N are always
marginal in the sense that #Lj(g) = 1. Remark 5.2 (iii) discusses the case of a so-called
complete star network, where player i is the center of the star involving all other players,
i.e., g = Li(gN) = {ij | j , i}.
In general it is not true that a player who can reﬁne the partitioning of the player set
into components by severing links need be a middleman. Indeed, consider a player i in a
network g such that #Γ(g) < #Γ(g \ h) for some h ⊂ Li(g). While this player could be a
middleman, she might also be a marginal player in the network g. In the latter case it is not
appropriate to label this player as a “middleman”, since she does not play a critical role in
communication among other players in the network.
This is illustrated by referring to the trivial two player network g1 = {12} on the player
set N = {1,2,3}. Note ﬁrst that Γ(g1) = {{1,2},{3}}.13 Observe that 12 is a critical link
in g1, but neither player 1 nor player 2 are middlemen. On the other hand, in the network
g2 = {12,13}, player 1 is a middleman. This conforms with the deﬁnition of a middleman.
We now introduce some further notation to describe the removal of a critical link set by
some middleman in the network. Let g ∈ GN be some network and let h ∈ C(g) be one of
its components. Let i ∈ M(h) be a middleman in h and let h∗ ⊂ Li(h) be a critical link set
for middleman i. Now we denote by C(h \ h∗) = {h1,h2,...,hm} the components obtained
from h by deleting the critical link set h∗. It should be clear that one of these components
might be empty. In particular, this is the case when N0(h \ h∗) , ∅. Furthermore, we
denote byb h ∈ C(h \ h∗) as the component of h that contains player i. So i ∈ N(b h). Note
thatb h might be the empty set. In that case player i herself has become an isolated node in
the disintegrated network after removal of h∗, i.e., i ∈ N0(h \ h∗). The latter is exactly the
situation covered in Remark 5.2(iii).
Deﬁnition 5.3 A pair (g,v) ∈ GN × VN is middleman secure if for every component h ∈
C(g), every middleman i ∈ M(h), and every critical link set h∗ ⊂ Li(h) for middleman i we
13It should be clear that this case is not covered by Remark 5.2, since it explicitly assumes #Γ(g1) = 1.












where C(h \ h∗) = {h1,h2,...,hm} andb h ∈ C(h \ h∗) such that i ∈ N(b h).
We ﬁrst show that middleman security implies critical link monotonicity.
Proposition 5.4 Let v ∈ VN
+ be nonnegative in the sense that v(g) > 0 for all g ∈ GN. If
(g,v) satisﬁes middleman security, then (g,v) satisﬁes critical link monotonicity as well.
Proof. Consider any component h ∈ C(g) of the network g and a critical link ij ∈ h. Denote
byh1 andh2 thetwocomponentsinthereducednetworkh−ijproducedbyseveringijwhere
i ∈ N(h1) and j ∈ N(h2). We have to consider three cases:
Case A: h1 = h2 = ∅.
In this case h consists of a single link, namely h = {ij}. Hence, n(h) = 2, n(h1) =















This is equivalent to critical link monotonicity.
Case B: h1 , ∅ and h2 = ∅.
Here, n(h) > 3, n(h1) = n(h)−1 > 2, n(h2) = 1, and v(h2) = 0. This case corresponds
to disconnecting exactly one marginal player j from the network g by middleman i.
In other words, player i is a middleman with the critical link set being {ij}. Suppose
that v(h) > v(h1) + v(h2) = v(h1). Then from the middleman security condition





















since by nonnegativity v(h1) > 0. Clearly this case satisﬁes critical link monotonicity
as well.
Case C: h1 , ∅ and h2 , ∅.
Here both players i and j could be middlemen. Considering player i as the middle-
man with critical link set {ij}, middleman security for i implies that







17Similarly, considering player jasthemiddleman with criticallink set{ij}, middleman
security for j implies that







Hence, from (12) and (13) it follows that











which is equivalent to the condition of critical link monotonicity.
This completes the proof of the assertion. ¤
Note that the construction in Example 4.7 does not satisfy middleman security. Consider
the critical link set h∗ = {ik,il} for middleman i in the network g = {ij,ik,il}. Severing all
links in h∗ results in one non-null component h1 =b h = {ij} and two disconnected players k
and l. Now, v(g) = 13 > 10 = v(b h) + v(∅) + v(∅) but
v(g)
n(g) = 31
4 < 5 =
v(b h)
n(b h). Observe that in
a middlemen secure network, a middleman prefers not to create disconnected components
by deleting a critical link set h∗. Thus for such networks an eﬃcient network is also SLDP
for the component wise egalitarian rule.
Proposition 5.5 If g ∈ GN is eﬃcient relative to a component additive v ∈ VN, then g is
strong link deletion proof with respect to the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule
Yce if and only if (g,v) is middleman secure.
Proof. Without loss of generality we restrict ourselves to a network g ∈ GN that consists of
a single component, i.e., #Γ(g) = 1, and such that g , ∅.
Only if: Suppose g is eﬃcient relative to v as well as strong deletion proof for Yce relative
to v. Then for any critical link set h∗ ⊂ Li(g) for middleman i ∈ M(g), it must hold that i








This evidently implies that middleman security holds for (g,v).
If: Suppose that g is eﬃcient relative to v and that (g,v) is middleman secure.
Severing a non-critical link set by any player will only change the value of the component
without changing the number of players in that component. By eﬃciency of g and compo-
nent additivity of v, this value is already at a maximum and hence there can be no net gain.
18Suppose that some middleman i ∈ M(g) in g severs a critical link set h∗ from Li(g). This re-
sults into the component setC(g\h∗) = {h1,...,hm}. This has no beneﬁt for the middleman





which by middleman security implies that (14) has to hold. This conﬁrms that g is in fact
strong link deletion proof.
This completes the proof of the assertion. ¤
The next result is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 5.5.
Corollary 5.6 If g ∈ GN is eﬃcient relative to a nonnegative and component additive
v ∈ VN
+, then g is strongly pairwise stable for the component-wise egalitarian allocation
rule Yce if and only if (g,v) is middleman secure.
Proof. From Proposition 5.5 we know that middleman security implies that g is strong link
deletion proof for Yce. Using Proposition 5.4 we know that middleman security implies
critical link monotonicity. From Claim 4.6, we know that if a network g satisﬁes critical
link monotonicity, it is pairwise stable as well and, therefore, link addition proof. Hence, g
has to be strongly pairwise stable. ¤
Corollary 5.6 demonstrates that middlemen exert crucial positional power in the alloca-
tion process of network beneﬁts. When they have no incentive to disconnect the network,
component-wise egalitarianism resolves the conﬂict between stability and eﬃciency. As
shown in the previous discussion, the presence of middlemen is crucial for the allocation
of network beneﬁts such that the eﬃcient networks are strongly pairwise stable.
Remark2.2emphasizesthatthecomponent-wiseegalitarianallocationruleistheunique
rule that combines the benign requirement of component balance and the equal treatment
of members of the same component in the network. This implies that it is the unique rule
that links the payoﬀ of individuals directly with the collective value generated by these
individuals. In this regard it is the unique allocation rule that points individuals directly
to eﬃciency. In other words, the collective value becomes the individualized payoﬀ for
all players, and network formation thus becomes a common interest non-cooperative en-
deavor.14
14We refer to Bowles (2004, Chapter 2) for a complete discussion of the properties of this type of non-
cooperative game.
196 Networks without middlemen
We ﬁrst turn to the study of networks that are always middlemen secure, irrespective
of the network value function employed. These networks are denoted as middleman-
free. Subsequently we investigate whether regular (or symmetric) networks are necessarily
middleman-free.
Formally a network g ∈ GN is called middleman-free if M(g) = ∅, i.e., in such net-
works there are no middleman positions. The next proposition proves that these networks
are always middleman secure and, hence, will also satisfy critical link monotonicity.
Proposition 6.1 A network g ∈ GN is middleman-free if and only if for every network value
function v ∈ VN the pair (g,v) is middleman secure.
Proof. We ﬁrst consider the case when n > 3 and the network g ∈ GN consists of a single
non-trivial component, i.e., #Γ(g) = 1. Since n > 3 it is obvious that g has to consist of at
least two links.
If:
Suppose to the contrary that g has at least one middleman. We proceed by constructing a
network value function v′ for which (g,v′) is not middleman secure.
Let i ∈ M(g) be a middleman in g. Note that by deﬁnition of a middleman position it has
to hold that #Li(g) > 2.
Next, consider a critical link set h∗ ⊂ Li(g) such that C(g\h∗) = {h1,...,hm} with i ∈ N(h1)
and n(h) > n(h1). It is clear that since g consists of at least two links, we can select the
critical link set h∗ for middleman i in this fashion. This follows from an application of the
characterization of a middleman position given in Remark 5.2.
Now select the network value function v′ such that v′(h) = v′(h1) = 1 and v′(hk) = 0 for all
k = 2,...,m. Then we have obviously that
v



















This implies that middleman security is not satisﬁed for the pair (g,v′).
Only if:
Suppose that g is middleman-free. Since M(g) = ∅ it follows immediately that for any
network value function v ∈ VN the pair (g,v) has to be middleman secure.
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Figure 1: A 3-regular network with one critical link
To show the assertion for any non-empty network, the only remaining case to be inves-
tigated is that g = {ij} for some i, j ∈ N. This network g is middleman free and as a
consequence it is middleman secure as well. Combining this insight with the previously
investigated case we have shown the assertion for any non-empty network. ¤
CombiningCorollary5.6andProposition6.1weattaintheinsightthateﬃcientandmiddleman-
free networks are always strongly pairwise stable under component-wise egalitarian pay-
oﬀs. In particular this has bearing on situations with link monotone value functions, in
which the complete network is eﬃcient.
Corollary 6.2 If g ∈ GN is middleman-free as well as eﬃcient relative to a nonnegative
and component additive v ∈ VN
+, then g is strongly pairwise stable for the component-wise
egalitarian allocation rule Yce.
We emphasize that in general very large networks with suﬃcient clustering can be expected
to be middleman-free. The reason is that in such networks there are enough redundant links
to allow for multiple paths between diﬀerent individuals preventing any individual from
having positional power.
Example 6.3 Regular networks
Regular networks form an interesting class of networks that is also popular in the networks
literature.15 For instance the empty network and the complete network are both regular
networks.
Formally a network g is k-regular if #Γ(g) = 1 and for every player i ∈ N it holds that
#Ni(g) = k. Hence, the network consists of exactly one component and every player is con-
nected to exactly k other players. Using strong pairwise stability Goyal and Joshi (2003)
ﬁnd many instances of regular networks both in case of positive and negative spillovers.
15They are also sometimes referred to as symmetric networks presumably since every agent has the same
number of links (Goyal and Joshi (2003)). As Figure 1 demonstrates their shape need not necessarily be
symmetric.
21M
Figure 2: A 4-regular network with a unique middleman position
The class of k-regular networks has a non-empty intersection with the class of middleman-
free networks for every k > 2. First, observe that middlemen free graphs are not a subset
of regular graphs since regular graphs need not be connected. Next, it is trivial to see that
every 2-regular network has essentially a unique topology and can be described as a circle
consisting of all n players. For k > 3 any complete network consisting of n = k +1 players
is k-regular and middleman free. Similarly, every k-bipartite graph with k > 2 will be mid-
dlemen free.
On the other hand, for k > 3 there exist networks with critical links and middlemen. Figure
1 depicts a 3-regular network with a unique critical link and, therefore, two middlemen
indicated by “M” in the ﬁgure. It should be remarked that it is impossible to construct a
3-regular network that has a unique middleman.
For larger values of k it is possible to construct k-regular networks with a unique mid-
dleman. This is illustrated in Figure 2 that depicts a 4-regular network with a unique
middleman indicated by “M”. ¤
7 Coda
In this paper we have shown that under the component-wise egalitarian rule there is no ten-
sion between strong pairwise stability and eﬃciency only for middlemen secure networks.
Our analysis makes it is clear that middleman positions give occupants widespread con-
trol over the functioning of the network. Kalai, Postlewaite, and Roberts (1978) already
investigated the consequences of middleman positions on payoﬀs. They arrived at some
surprising insights, that have great aﬃnity with the main result from our analysis.
22Our analysis makes clear that further research is needed on the role of middlemen in the
allocation of beneﬁts over participants in network situations. This analysis should not be
limited to collective beneﬁt problems, but also extend to individualistic payoﬀ situations.
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24Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4.2
In order to proof the assertion of Proposition 4.2 we ﬁrst prove a lemma whose repeated
application ensures the result. All subsequent notions are developed within the context
of the symmetric connections model with payoﬀ parameter δ ∈ (0,1) and cost parameter
c > 0.
Consider any network g and the severance of some link ij. Deletion of this link cannot
reduce the geodesic distance between player i and any other arbitrary player k. Therefore
i’s beneﬁts are nonincreasing in the deletion of any arbitrary link. Denote by βik(g − ij)
the reduction in gross beneﬁts accruing to player i from player k by deleting link ij ∈ g
through a possible increase in geodesic distance between i and k. Then, βik(g − ij) > 0.
The set of k for which βik(g − ij) is positive is rather restricted. Namely βik(g − ij) > 0 for
all pik(g) ∈ Pik(g), pik(g) ∩ Li(g) = {ij}. In that case
βik(g − ij) = δ
tik(g) − δ
tik(g−ij)
Deﬁne Wij(g) = {k ∈ N | βik(g − ij) > 0}. Obviously, j ∈ Wij(g).
Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), let ui(g − ij) denote the gain to agent i by
deleting link ij. Then,




In general we use ui(g \ h∗) to denote the gain to agent i by deleting a star h∗ ⊂ g.16
Lemma 1 For any network g such that ii1,ii2 ∈ g, ui(g − ii2 − ii1) 6 ui(g − ii2).
Proof. First recall that any path between i and k ∈ N cannot include more than one member
of Li(g). Given that any path between k ∈ Wii2(g) must by deﬁnition include ii2, it cannot
possibly include ii1. Hence, elimination of ii1 cannot disconnect any such path. Hence,
Wii2(g) = Wii2(g − ii1) = W (15)
This also means that the geodesic distance between i and k, where k ∈ W, in g and g − ii1
are the same. Hence, for all k ∈ W,
tik(g) = tik(g − ii1) (16)
Now,











16Obviously i has to be the center of the star h.
25Also,
ui(g − ii1 − ii2) = c −
X
k∈Wii2(g−ii1)
βik(g − ii1 − ii2) = c −
X
k∈W















Hence, in order to ﬁnd out which one is greater, we have to compare tik(g − ii2) and tik(g \
{ii1,ii2}) for all k ∈ W. Given, g\{ii1,ii2} ⊂ g−ii2, tik(g\{ii1,ii2}) > tik(g−ii2). Also, given
0 < δ < 1 and tik(g \ {ii1,ii2}) > tik(g − ii2), δtik(g\{ii1,ii2}) 6 δtik(g−ii2) for all k ∈ W. Hence, the
assertion of the lemma has been proved. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
Proof. Let g be a pairwise stable network in the symmetric connections model. To prove
the assertion we only have to show that the network is strong link deletion proof. Consider
any player i contemplating deletion of a set of m links ii1,ii2,...,iim where i1,i2,...,im ∈
Ni(g). Let h∗ = {ii1,ii2,...,iim}. Then, one way to represent the resulting gain is as follows:
ui(g \ h
∗) = ui(g − ii1) + ui(g \ {ii1,ii2}) +     + ui(g \ {ii1,ii2,...,iim}) (17)
Since, g is strong deletion proof, ui(g − iil) 6 0 for all l = 1,2,...,m. Applying Lemma 1
we get
ui(g \ {ii1,ii2} 6 ui(g − ii2) 6 0
Repeated application of the lemma gives us
ui(g \ {ii1,ii2,ii3}) 6 ui(g \ {ii1,ii3} 6 ui(g − ii3) 6 0
Proceeding thus each term on the right hand side of the third inequality is non-positive.
Hence ui(g \ h∗) being a sum of non-positive terms is non-positive as well. Consequently,
g is strong link deletion proof.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.2. ¤
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